Social Security at 91: Two Bipartisan Blueprints For Solvency

This week marks the 91st anniversary of Social Security, a program that has provided retirement and disability income to generations of Americans. However, the Social Security trustees recently released their annual report, and the news is troubling. Barring significant congressional action before 2032, Social Security’s Old-Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI) trust fund will be depleted, triggering an across-the-board cut of 22% to everyone’s benefits. 

Lawmakers from both parties have introduced proposals that aim to create structured, bipartisan processes for producing durable plans to secure Social Security’s finances. Below is an explanation of each proposal, a comparison of their approaches, and highlights what they share: a commitment to a transparent, expedited path toward long-term solvency.

The Bipartisan Social Security Commission Act of 2026 (H.R. 9187)

What it does: H.R. 9187 establishes a 13‑member Commission on Long‑Term Social Security Solvency charged with developing recommendations and draft legislation to ensure the solvency of both the Old‑Age and Survivors Insurance Trust Fund and the Disability Insurance Trust Fund for at least 75 years, measured from one year after the Commission’s first meeting.

Structure and process: The Commission is bipartisan with one member appointed by the President and the rest appointed by Congressional leadership from both parties. The leadership of the Commission is split between a President‑appointed chair and a Speaker‑designated co‑chair. Members serve without pay but receive travel expenses. At least two of the members, one appointed by each party, must be an outside expert who is not an elected official. The Commission must hold at least one public hearing, may draw on federal agency data and expert assistance, and is supported by a Director and staff funded by up to $2 million in appropriations.

Deliverable and timeline: Within one year of convening, the Commission must submit a special message to Congress containing recommendations and proposed legislation approved by a super-majority of at least nine members. After submission, an expedited congressional process is triggered: Congress must promptly consider an approval bill based on the Commission’s proposals, with no amendments and  limits on debate to encourage swift action. The Commission sunsets 60 days after delivering its report.

The PROMISE Act of 2026 (Protecting Retirement Opportunities and Maintaining Income Security for Everyone)

What it does: The PROMISE Act (S. 4979) tasks the Social Security Advisory Board–an independent, bipartisan federal agency that provides advice and recommendations to policymakers on Social Security–with developing recommendations and legislative language to achieve long‑term solvency defined as the ability to pay 100% of scheduled benefits for at least 50 years from enactment.

Structure and process: The Advisory Board’s work is designed to be transparent and participatory: it must solicit public input through requests for information and public listening sessions. Once the Board issues its recommendations, the bill requires a special congressional process to consider legislation based on that language. The process emphasizes strict rules on amendments, changes must maintain or improve solvency, and sets timelines for committee consideration and floor action. The bill also requires bipartisan support for introduction and passage.

Ongoing review: The PROMISE Act builds in a decennial review: if the Social Security Trustees report that the trust funds will not be solvent for the next 50 years, the Advisory Board must again produce recommendations and Congress must consider them under the same expedited procedures.

Key differences at a glance

Analysis: complementary designs with different emphases

Both proposals share a common premise: create a bipartisan, expert‑driven pathway that produces concrete legislative language and pushes Congress to act quickly. Their differences reflect distinct tradeoffs.

• Solvency time horizon: H.R. 9187 is focused on the traditional  goal of 75-year solvency, while the PROMISE Act is focused on 50-year solvency. 
• One-time vs. Ongoing. The Commission approach is a one-time effort with more time allocated on the front end, one year, to develop a plan, but no mechanism to revisit the effort. The PROMISE Act leverages an existing advisory body so has a much tighter deadline for producing an initial report (about one month). However, the PROMISE Act embeds a recurring review cycle that institutionalizes ongoing oversight rather than a single concentrated effort.
• Fresh body vs. institutional memory. A new commission can attract specially chosen experts and bipartisan appointees and may command public attention. The Advisory Board route relies on an established institution with experience in Social Security issues, which can be advantageous for follow‑up and implementation.
• Public engagement and legitimacy. PROMISE’s explicit requirements for RFIs and listening sessions emphasize stakeholder input and transparency, but its compressed timeline may limit extended public engagement. H.R. 9187 requires only one public hearing, though the Commission could hold more.
• Amendments. H.R. 9187 does not allow any amendments, which ensures an up or down vote on the original Commission proposal. The PROMISE Act allows limited amendments as long as long term solvency is maintained. 
• Report approval. H.R. 9187’s requirement that a super-majority of nine Commission members approve the package could be problematic. The Social Security Advisory Board operates with a majority rule procedure.

Conclusion

On Social Security’s 91st anniversary, these two bipartisan proposals reflect a shared recognition: the program’s long‑term health requires structured, credible, and politically viable processes to produce and advance reform.